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OPINION OF THE COURT
         
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
The ministerial exception to Title VII, a doctrine adopted
by numerous courts, exempts religious organizations from
4employment discrimination suits brought by ministers.
Grounded in the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the
United States Constitution, the ministerial exception was created
to protect church autonomy and avoid entangling government in
religious affairs.  This case requires us to determine the reach of
the ministerial exception in this Circuit.  
We adopt a carefully tailored version of the ministerial
exception.  Where otherwise illegal discrimination is based on
religious belief, religious doctrine, or the internal regulations of
a church, the First Amendment exempts religious institutions
from Title VII.  In such cases, restricting a church’s freedom to
select its ministers would violate the Free Exercise Clause by
inhibiting the church’s ability to express its beliefs and put them
into practice.  Furthermore, questions about religious matters
would pervade litigation, entangling courts in ecclesiastical
matters and violating the Establishment Clause. 
5But where a church discriminates for reasons unrelated
to religion, we hold that the Constitution does not foreclose Title
VII suits.  Employment discrimination unconnected to religious
belief, religious doctrine, or the internal regulations of a church
is simply the exercise of intolerance, not the free exercise of
religion that the Constitution protects.  Furthermore, in
adjudicating suits that do not involve religious rationales for
employment action, courts need not consider questions of
religious belief, religious doctrine, or internal church regulation,
a process that would violate the Establishment Clause by
entangling courts in religious affairs.  
Lynette Petruska brings suit against Gannon University,
a Catholic institution, and various Gannon University officials
(collectively, “Gannon”).  She alleges in replete detail that
Gannon, acting without any religious or ecclesiastical
motivation, demoted her because she is a woman and because
2At all events, the District Court did not engage in
factfinding, and what we deal with here is functionally a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal.
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she opposed sexual harassment by Gannon officials. 
The District Court granted Gannon’s motion to dismiss
Petruska’s Title VII claims under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), reasoning that the ministerial exception
barred these claims.  As we explain below, a motion such as
Gannon’s is more properly dealt with under Rule 12(b)(6),
which requires us to treat Petruska’s allegations as true.2
Accordingly, we assume that Gannon lacked a religious
rationale for Petruska’s demotion.  We will therefore reverse the
dismissal of her Title VII claims.  
Petruska also asserts state law causes of action for breach
of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent supervision
and retention, and civil conspiracy.  The District Court
dismissed these claims under Rule 12(b)(1), reasoning that the
3We will reverse the dismissal of Petruska’s state law
claims, with the exception of the fraudulent misrepresentation
claim.  This claim was not pled with sufficient particularity under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).
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religion clauses removed jurisdiction.  Reviewing the dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6), we cannot conclude at this stage of
litigation that these claims will require an examination of
matters of faith, doctrine, or internal church regulation.
Therefore, they are not barred by the religion clauses.3  
I.
The facts set forth below are drawn from Petruska’s First
Amended Complaint, which we must accept as true for purposes
of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  Gannon University is a Catholic
diocesan college located in Erie, Pennsylvania.  Gannon hired
Petruska as the university’s Director of Social Concerns in July
of 1997.  Petruska was appointed permanent chaplain on July 1,
1999.  She was to be the first female chaplain in Gannon’s
8history.
Prior to accepting the position, Petruska sought
assurances from Gannon’s President, David Rubino, that she
would not be replaced when Reverend Nicholas Rouch, a former
Gannon chaplain who had left to study in Rome, returned, or
when another male became available.  She submits that she
requested these assurances due to:  (1) a policy or practice of
gender discrimination at Gannon; (2) her knowledge that the
position of chaplain had been promised to Rouch upon his
return; and (3) the reputation of Bishop Donald Trautman, chair
of Gannon’s Board of Directors, for being unable to work with
women and for removing women from leadership positions.
Rubino assured Petruska that decisions regarding her tenure as
chaplain would be based solely on her performance, and not her
gender.
Petruska’s role as chaplain was essentially that of a vice
9president.  She served in a cabinet-level position on the
President’s staff and was co-chair of Gannon’s Catholic Identity
Task Force.  Petruska’s religious duties included holding prayer
services and planning liturgies.
Several months after Petruska’s appointment, in March
of 2000, Rubino was forced to take a leave of absence when he
was accused of having a sexual affair with a female subordinate.
 Rubino admitted the affair to various university officials.
Thereafter, a different female employee accused Rubino of
sexual harassment.  Petruska was instrumental in bringing this
claim to the attention of Trautman and Provost Thomas
Ostrowski.  Rubino resigned in May of 2000 and Ostrowski was
appointed acting President.  At Trautman’s behest, Gannon then
began a campaign to conceal Rubino’s misconduct.
Petruska served on Gannon’s Sexual Harassment
Committee as the university was in the process of revising its
4Petruska also alleges that she challenged the propriety of
allowing a former Gannon priest, who was removed due to sexual
misconduct toward students, from returning to campus.
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sexual harassment policy.  Although several of Gannon’s
lawyers advocated limiting the time period in which grievances
could be filed, Petruska opposed this proposal, and her view
ultimately prevailed.  Petruska was also involved in preparing a
report that criticized Gannon’s discrimination and harassment
policies.  Despite a request from Gannon’s President, the
committee that prepared the report refused to modify portions
criticizing the university.4
In July of 2000, Ostrowski, then serving as acting
President, met with Trautman, as well as Rouch, who had
returned from Rome.  Trautman told Ostrowski to place the
Chaplain’s Division under the control of Rouch, thereby making
Petruska Rouch’s subordinate.  Ostrowski refused.
Ostrowski told Petruska about Trautman’s plan and asked
11
Petruska how she would respond if the Chaplain’s Division were
placed under Rouch’s leadership.  According to Petruska,
Ostrowski conceded that the proposed action was being taken
solely on the basis of Petruska’s gender.  Later, Ostrowski
“made it clear to [Petruska] that Trautman and Rouch would
never let her remain Chaplain at Gannon because of her gender.”
In a January 2001 meeting, Ostrowski was informed that
once a new President was appointed, Trautman intended to
“clean house” by removing three high-ranking university
officials, all of whom were female:  Petruska, the Executive
Director of Admissions, and the acting Provost.  In May of
2001, Antoine Garibaldi was appointed President of Gannon.
As President, Garibaldi required Rouch’s approval of all
important decisions that Petruska, as chaplain, ordinarily made.
In August of 2002, Garibaldi notified Petruska that he
had decided to restructure the university, that she would be
12
removed from the President’s Staff, and that the Chaplain’s
Division would report to Rouch.  The effect of the restructuring
was to make Rouch Petruska’s boss. 
After a series of events convinced Petruska that she was
on the verge of being fired, she tendered her resignation in
October of 2002.  After Petruska’s resignation, Rouch
repeatedly told Gannon students and staff that a woman would
not be considered to replace Petruska as chaplain.
Petruska filed this action in the District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania against Gannon University,
Gannon’s Board of Trustees, and various Gannon officials.
Petruska asserted six claims, naming some or all of the
defendants in the following counts: (1) Title VII sex
discrimination; (2) Title VII retaliation; (3) fraudulent
misrepresentation; (4) civil conspiracy; (5) breach of contract;
and (6) negligent supervision and retention.  The District Court
5Compare Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists,
772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Of course churches are not
— and should not be — above the law.”), with Bollard v.
California Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir.
1999) (“[T]he Free Exercise Clause protects the power of religious
organizations ‘to decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith
13
granted Gannon’s motion to dismiss the complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), concluding that the religion
clauses barred adjudication of Petruska’s claims. 
II.
Federal courts have long struggled to balance state
regulation and religious freedom.  See, e.g., Serbian Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).  In the
employment context, the source of this conflict is readily
apparent.  The government possesses a vital interest in
promoting equality in the workplace, but this interest at times
collides with the constitutional right of a religious institution to
 be free from excessive state interference.5  In balancing these
and doctrine.’”) (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the
Russian Orthodox Church of N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).  
14
competing interests, several courts have applied the ministerial
exception, which exempts religious institutions from Title VII
suits brought by employees charged with ministerial duties.  
In McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 555 (5th
Cir. 1972), the seminal case on the ministerial exception, a
female officer of the Salvation Army alleged that she received
a lower salary and fewer benefits than male employees, and that
she was discharged for complaining of these disparities.   The
Fifth Circuit held that the First Amendment barred the former
officer’s claim, stating: 
The relationship between an organized church and
its ministers is its lifeblood.  The minister is the
chief instrument by which the church seeks to
fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this
relationship must necessarily be recognized as of
prime ecclesiastical concern.  
6See EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d
795 (4th Cir. 2000); Rayburn, 772 F.2d 1164; McClure, 460 F.2d
553; Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d
698 (7th Cir. 2003); Young v. Northern Illinois Conf. of United
Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994); Scharon v. St.
Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals, 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir.
1991); Werft v. Desert Southwest Annual Conf. of the United
Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Gellington v.
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299 (11th
Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir.
1996).  
7See E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213
F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000) (“The exception precludes any
inquiry whatsoever into the reasons behind a church’s ministerial
employment decision. The church need not, for example, proffer
any religious justification for its decision . . .”); Combs v. Central
Texas Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d
343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999); Young, 21 F.3d at 186; Alicea-
Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 703; Scharon, 929 F.2d at 363; Werft, 377
F.3d at 1103; Catholic Univ of Am., 83 F.3d at 464-65.
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Id. at 558-59.  
Seven federal circuits now recognize the ministerial
exception.6  Six have held that the exception applies regardless
of whether the motive for the discrimination is religious in
nature.7  In evaluating whether a particular employee’s suit is
Although the Eleventh Circuit has recognized the ministerial
exception, see Gellington, 203 F.3d 1299, it does not appear to
have directly addressed whether the exception applies without
regard to motive.
8See also Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 703 (applying the
ministerial exception to a Hispanic Communications Manager who
functioned as a “press secretary” for the church); Starkman v.
Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175-76 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a choir
director at a Methodist church was a minister for purposes of First
Amendment analysis).
16
subject to the ministerial exception, the essential question is
whether the employee’s “primary functions” serve the “spiritual
and pastoral mission” of a church.  E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ.
of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1986).8 
Courts have derived the ministerial exception both
through direct constitutional analysis and by applying the
doctrine that ambiguous statutes must be interpreted to avoid
significant constitutional risks.  The Fourth Circuit determined
that Title VII applies by its clear language to ministerial
employment decisions.  See Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-
9See McClure, 460 F.2d at 560 (Free Exercise Clause);
Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 702-03 (Free Exercise Clause);
Young, 21 F.3d at 186 (Free Exercise Clause), Werft, 377 F.3d at
1101 (both religion clauses); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167-72 (both
religion clauses); Scharon, 929 F.2d at 361-63 (both religion
clauses).
17
Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1165-67 (4th Cir. 1985).  The
Court therefore reached the direct constitutional question and
held that the religion clauses bar employment suits by ministers.
See id. at 1165-72; see also Scharon, 929 F.2d at 361-63.
McClure, however, applied the constitutional avoidance doctrine
and reasoned that Title VII does not apply unambiguously to the
hiring and firing of ministers.  See 460 F.2d at 560-61.  
Courts have also derived the ministerial exception from
different constitutional provisions.  Some have concluded that
the Free Exercise Clause commands the exception, whereas
others have opined that the exception is rooted in both the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.9
10See, e.g., Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171 (“Church personnel
and records would inevitably become subject to subpoena,
discovery, cross-examination, the full panoply of legal process
designed to probe the mind of the church in the selection of its
ministers.”); Scharon, 929 F.2d at 363 (“It is not only the
conclusions that may be reached ... which may impinge on rights
guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but also the very process of
inquiry.”) (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S.
490, 502 (1979)).
18
Our survey of Court of Appeals decisions has revealed
three explanations of why the Constitution may require the
ministerial exception.  We delineate these rationales now and
later consider whether they apply to this case.  First, some courts
have articulated a “government scrutiny” rationale, which holds
that the ministerial exception is necessary to avoid government
probing or examination of a church’s affairs.10  The
“government scrutiny” rationale is based on the Establishment
Clause, which commands the government to avoid entanglement
11See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171 (“[P]ervasive monitoring
by public authorities ... infringes precisely those Establishment
Clause values at the root of the prohibition of excessive
entanglement.”) (quoting Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413
(1985)) (alterations in original); see generally Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
12See, e.g., Werft, 377 F.3d at 1101 (“[B]ecause clergy
represent a religious institution to the people, a religious institution
must retain unfettered freedom in its choice of clergy.”).  
13Rayburn, for example, derives the “selection of clergy”
argument from both clauses.  See 772 F.2d at 1168 (“Any attempt
by government to restrict a church’s free choice of its leaders . . .
constitutes a burden on the church’s free exercise rights.”)
(emphasis added); id at 1171 (“Bureaucratic suggestion in
19
in religious matters.11
Second, some courts have advanced a “selection of
clergy” rationale.  Under this theory, religious institutions
should be free to select their own ministers, and the government
should have no role in this process.   Whereas the “government
scrutiny” rationale focuses on the process of judicial inquiry, the
“selection of clergy” rationale aims to prevent the government
from controlling actual employment decisions.12  While our
sister circuits have grounded the “selection of clergy” argument
in both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause,13
employment decisions of a pastoral character, in contravention of
a church’s own perception of its needs and purposes, would
constitute unprecedented entanglement with religious authority. .
.”) (emphasis added).
14See also Combs, 173 F.3d at 350 (“[S]ecular authorities
would be involved in evaluating or interpreting religious
doctrine.”); Simpson, 494 F.2d at 493 (“[C]ivil courts are barred by
the First Amendment from determining ecclesiastical questions.”).
20
it appears to flow more naturally from the Free Exercise Clause,
because it focuses on the right of a church to put its beliefs into
practice through its choice of ministers.
Finally, some courts have based the ministerial exception
on an “inquiry into religious doctrine” rationale.  Under this
justification, the ministerial exception is necessary to prevent
courts from resolving religious questions, which lie beyond
judicial competence and authority.  The Eighth Circuit has
opined that “to review [ministerial employment] decisions
would require the courts to determine the meaning of religious
doctrine and canonical law.”  Scharon, 929 F.2d at 363.14  The
“inquiry into religious doctrine” rationale is more narrow than
the “government scrutiny” rationale.  The “government
15See Scharon, 929 F.2d at 363 (stating that to decide
questions of religious doctrine and law would violate the Free
Exercise Clause); Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1304 (stating that an
employment suit would involve the government “in questions of
religious doctrine, polity, and practice” in violation of the
Establishment Clause (quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603
(1979)).
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scrutiny” rationale is concerned with any intrusion into the
internal affairs of a church, regardless of whether the
government intrudes in a manner that requires it to resolve
religious questions.  The “inquiry into religious doctrine”
rationale has been framed both in Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause terms.15
This Court has not had occasion in prior cases to adopt or
reject the ministerial exception.  In two cases, however, we have
considered employment claims brought against religious
organizations by non-ministerial employees.  In Little v. Wuerl,
929 F.2d 944, 946 (3d Cir. 1991), a Catholic school refused to
rehire a teacher because she remarried without following the
proper canonical process to validate her second marriage.  We
concluded that §§ 702 and 703(e)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§
22
2000e-1 and 2000e-2(e)(1), exempt “conduct [that] does not
conform to [religious] mores.”  Id. at 945.  Therefore, we held
that the school could decline to rehire the plaintiff on the basis
of her remarriage.  Id. at 951.  
The ministerial exception did not apply in Little both
because the plaintiff was not a ministerial employee and
because she was discharged on the basis of religion, thus
triggering statutory exemptions under Title VII.  Nonetheless,
we did mention the ministerial exception in dicta:  “[C]ourts
have consistently found that Title VII does not apply to the
relationship between ministers and the religious organizations
that employ them, even where discrimination is alleged on the
basis of race or sex.”  Id. at 947 (citing McClure and Rayburn).
In Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish
School, 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993), a teacher brought suit against
a parochial school under the ADEA.  Like Little,
Geary involved a non-ministerial employee.  However, whereas
the plaintiff in Little brought a claim for religious
16See, e.g., Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 701; Young, 21
F.3d at 185.
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discrimination, the plaintiff in Geary sued for age
discrimination.  Id. at 328.  Specifically, the plaintiff contended
that she was fired due to her age, while the school asserted that
she was fired for marrying a divorced man.  Id. at 326.  We
concluded that the plaintiff’s suit did not “present a significant
risk” of infringing the First Amendment.  Id. at 331. 
With these precedents in mind, we turn to Petruska’s
claims, and the procedural posture in which they come to us.
III.
The District Court dismissed Petruska’s claims under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).  While some courts
consider the ministerial exception to be jurisdictional in nature,
and therefore view a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) as
the proper mechanism for asserting the exception,16 other courts
opine that where the exception applies, the plaintiff fails to state
17See, e.g., Werft, 377 F.3d at 1100; Minker v. Baltimore
Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1356
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
18At issue in a 12(b)(1) motion is the court’s “very power to
hear the case.”  Mortensen v. First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n,
549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).  A 12(b)(6) motion, by contrast,
tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim.  The question is
whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action.  In that respect,
as the Tenth Circuit noted in Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the
Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th Cir. 2002), the
assertion of the ministerial exception—or, in that case, the “church
autonomy doctrine”—is akin to a government official’s defense of
qualified immunity, which is often raised in a 12(b)(6) motion.  Id.
The exception may bar the plaintiff’s causes of action, but it does
not affect the court’s authority to consider them.
Although McClure, the case that first articulated the
ministerial exception, spoke of it in jurisdictional terms, the Court
based the exception on an interpretation of § 703 of Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2, the provision under which the plaintiff brought
suit.  460 F.2d at 555-56, 560-61.  Section 703 does not confer
jurisdiction but instead creates a right of action for sex
discrimination.  Because the ministerial exception is a limitation on
§ 703, and because § 703 creates a right of action, it follows that
the ministerial exception restricts a plaintiff’s right of action, not
a court’s jurisdiction. 
Moreover, a federal  court undoubtedly has the authority to
review claims arising under federal law.  Elvig v. Calvin
Presbyterian Church,  375 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Federal
question jurisdiction is statutorily established, giving district courts
24
a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).17  For the reasons stated in the
margin, we conclude that the ministerial exception is properly
raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.18  We therefore review
‘original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.’”).
25
Petruska’s complaint under that rule.  
So construing the motion to dismiss, we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Jordan v. Fox Rothschild O’Brien
& Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).  Our review
is plenary.  Id.  Petruska’s allegations, and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from them, must be deemed true,
and must be viewed in the light most favorable to her.  See
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350-351 (3d Cir. 2005). 
Petruska’s complaint alleges that she was demoted
because she is a woman.  The complaint states that Gannon’s
acting President, Thomas Ostrowski, told Petruska that she was
to be demoted “solely on the basis of her gender.” (emphasis
added). 
When a religious organization fires or demotes a woman
on the basis of sex, it may be acting according to religious
belief, religious doctrine, or church regulation (consider, for
26
example, the Catholic Church’s prohibition of female priests).
In such a case, the religious organization would be immune from
a Title VII suit.  But a religious institution might also fire a
woman because the individuals making the decision are, simply
put, sexist.  Religious doctrine and internal church regulation
play no role in such a decision.
Considering the complaint in the light most favorable to
Petruska, we must conclude that this is the latter type of case:
Under the pleadings, Petruska was fired due to sexism
unmoored from religious principle.  Nothing in the complaint
suggests that, as a matter of Catholic doctrine, women cannot
serve as university chaplains; indeed, Petruska was hired as
Gannon’s chaplain.  The complaint alleges that sexism and
sexual harassment at Gannon are rampant and points to no
religious justification for this alleged state of affairs.  Gannon’s
former President, David Rubino, admitted to having an affair
with a subordinate.  Another female employee accused Rubino
of sexual harassment, forcing Gannon to settle her claim.  The
19Gannon’s creation of a Vice President for Mission and
Ministry position may be viewed as a decision pursuant to an
internal regulation.  Presumably, the new position was somehow
written into Gannon’s policies.  However, we construe Petruska’s
complaint to allege that Gannon violated Title VII not by creating
the position but by installing Rouch into the position, despite the
fact that the new position gave duties to Rouch that formerly
belonged to Petruska.  After all, Title VII regulates not an
organization’s power to chose its own structure or to create new
positions but its ability to install particular individuals into those
positions.  Gannon has cited no explanation grounded in religious
belief, religious doctrine, or internal regulation for the decision to
give to Rouch what had, in effect, been Petruska’s job.  
27
complaint further states that Gannon has a custom or practice of
sex discrimination and that Gannon undertook a campaign to
cover up the former President’s sexual misconduct.  Petruska
alleges that Trautman has removed women from leadership
positions in his Diocese due to their sex and that he has a
reputation for being unable to work with women.
This case plainly presents the question whether a
ministerial employee may bring suit under Title VII where the
religious institution lacks a rationale for the employment action
that is grounded in faith, doctrine, or internal regulation.19  We
now turn to this question.
20Section 703 of Title VII provides:
  




Where a federal statute poses “a significant risk of
infringing the First Amendment,” we must consider whether
there is “a permissible construction of the statute that avoids that
risk.”  Geary, 7 F.3d at 327; see also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979).  If there is such a
permissible construction, we adopt it, and do not reach the
constitutional question.  See Geary, 7 F.3d at 327. 
Although McClure, 460 F.2d at 560-61, held that Title
VII could be fairly construed not to apply to ministerial
employees, the Fourth Circuit has held that Congress clearly
expressed an intent to bring ministers within the reach of Title
VII.  See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1166.  The plain language of
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination extends to the
employment of ministers by religious institutions.20  Likewise,
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s . . . sex . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
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Title VII’s retaliation provision, under which Petruska also
brings suit, contains no exception for religious organizations.  42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
Furthermore, as the Fourth Circuit noted in Rayburn, §
702 of Title VII contains a limited exemption for “a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society.”
772 F.2d at 1166.  However, the exemption is restricted to the
decision to employ “individuals of a particular religion” to
perform work connected with the organization’s activities.  See
id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.  Thus, Congress gave churches the
explicit right to discriminate on the basis of religion, but
declined to create a right to discriminate on the basis of sex or
to retaliate against an employee for complaining of sex
discrimination.  See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1166-67.
21Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167.  (citing H.R. Rep. No. 914,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. Cong. &
Admin. News 2355, 2391, 2402).
22Id. (citing P.L. 88-352, Title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255
(July 2, 1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. Cong. & Admin. News 287,
304).
23Id. (citing P.L. 92-261 § 3, 86 Stat. 103-104 (March 24,
1972)).
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Rayburn also concluded that Title VII’s “legislative
history reinforces the plain meaning of the statutory text.”  Id.
at 1167.  Congress repeatedly considered and recalibrated the
limited exemption for religious employers, but never gave such
employers the power to discriminate on the basis of sex.  As
originally passed by the House in 1964, Title VII entirely
exempted religious corporations, associations, or societies.21
The final version, however, limited the exemption to
discrimination on the basis of religion against employees
involved in “religious activities.”22  In 1972, the exemption was
broadened by deleting the word “religious” before “activities.”23
However, the Senate rejected a proposal that would have
expanded the exemption so far as to prohibit all Title VII suits
24See Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare of the United States Senate, Legislative History
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (Comm. Print
1972), at 376, 881, 1229-1230, 1258-1260, cited in Rayburn, 772
F.2d at 1167.
25Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1746, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, reprinted in Legislative
History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, at
1844, 1845, cited in Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167 (emphasis added).
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against religious organizations.24  Finally, the section-by-section
analysis of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
stated that religious organizations “remain subject to the
provisions of Title VII with regard to race, color, sex or national
origin.”25  
In light of the foregoing analysis, we agree with the
Fourth Circuit that the ministerial exception must derive directly
from the Constitution, and not from Title VII.
B.
Under the terms of Title VII, a woman denied admission
to the priesthood could sue the Catholic Church for sex
discrimination.  However, it is clear that Title VII cannot
constitutionally extend to discrimination based on religious
26By “church regulation,” we mean the internal rules under
which a religious institution operates.
27See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 564
(1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Free Exercise Clause is
properly understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to
participate in religious activities without impermissible
governmental interference.”) (emphasis added). 
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belief, religious doctrine, or church regulation.26  Preventing a
church from hiring ministers in accordance with its own beliefs
would inhibit its ability to put its doctrines into practice and
would therefore violate the Free Exercise Clause.  Furthermore,
such litigation would entangle courts in religious matters, in
violation of the Establishment Clause.
This case, however, is about something completely
different.  Petruska alleges that she was demoted because of
animus against women that had nothing to do with religious
beliefs, religious doctrine, or internal regulation. 
While several of our sister circuits have opined that the
employer’s reasons are irrelevant to the ministerial exception,
see supra pp. 10-11, we conclude that these reasons make all the
difference.  The Constitution protects religious exercise,27 and
28According to a leading scholar of the religion clauses, “[t]o
grant First Amendment immunity to . . . religious organizations in
circumstances where its actions were not dictated by religious
belief . . . is to invite misbehavior.  Moreover, it seems unfair to
deprive the poorly treated and now-estranged employee of any
opportunity to bring the religious entity to account. . . .”  Marci A.
Hamilton, God vs. the Gavel: Religion and the Rule of Law 196
(2005).  
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we decline to turn the Free Exercise Clause into a license for the
free exercise of discrimination unmoored from religious
principle.28  We therefore conclude that under the Free Exercise
Clause the ministerial exception will not bar Title VII claims by
ministerial employees when an employment decision is not
motivated by religious belief, religious doctrine, or church
regulation.  This version of the ministerial exception also
comports with the Establishment Clause because  courts will not
be forced to consider religious questions, a process that would
entangle the government in religious affairs.  
1.
The Supreme Court has not addressed the ministerial
exception, but our sister circuits have purported to derive it from
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Supreme Court cases that discuss the importance of church
autonomy.  However, the church autonomy cases protect a
particular type of liberty: the right of a church to construe its
own laws, regulations, and beliefs free of judicial interference.
Because Title VII is a secular federal law as opposed to an
internal ecclesiastical law, and because Gannon has offered no
religious rationale for Petruska’s demotion, the church
autonomy cases do not apply.
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696 (1976), stands for the proposition that a plaintiff cannot
sue a church for departing from or misapplying its own laws and
regulations.  In Milivojevich, the Supreme Court of Illinois set
aside a Bishop’s removal and defrockment and the
reorganization of a Diocese.  Id. at 708.  Critically, the basis for
the state court’s decision was that the church violated its own
internal regulations, including its constitution and penal code.
Id. at 708, 712-13.  The Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment barred the state court’s inquiries into whether
29Additionally, Gonzalez has nothing to do with the First
Amendment: It was decided based on the terms of the trust, and
without reference to the Constitution.  See Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
at 729-30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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church proceedings were “procedurally and substantively
defective under the internal regulations of the Mother Church.”
Id. at 698 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manilla, 280 U.S. 1 (1929), the Court declined to overrule a
church’s interpretation of ecclesiastical law.  An archbishop
refused to appoint the plaintiff to a hereditary chaplaincy created
by a trust, and the plaintiff sought a judgment declaring him the
legal heir.  Id. at 10-12.  The archbishop’s decision was based on
provisions of the Codex Juris Canonici, which stated that to be
eligible for a chaplaincy, one must have begun the study of
theology.  Id. at 13-14.  The Court refused to overrule the
archbishop’s construction of ecclesiastical law.  Id. at 16.29   
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872), applies
the same principle.  The Watson Court “was asked to decree the
30Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952), is also inapposite.  Kedroff
involved a dispute between the Moscow-based Russian Orthodox
Church and its North American branch over the right to use and
occupy a cathedral.  Id. at 95-97.  A New York law aimed to
strengthen the North American branch at the expense of the
Moscow-based church.  See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 109.  The
Supreme Court invalidated the New York statute largely because
it was designed “for the benefit of one segment of a church” at the
expense of another.  Id. at 119.  Thus, Kedroff stands for the
familiar proposition that the state may not favor one religious
group over another, a principle that has no relevance to this case.
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termination of an implied trust because of departures from
doctrine.”  Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church,  393 U.S. 440,
445 (1969).  As the Watson Court stated,  “whenever the
questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom,
or law have been decided” by church tribunals, “the legal
tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on
them.”  80 U.S.  at 727.30
Thus, the Supreme Court’s church autonomy cases
protect a religious institution’s freedom to interpret its own laws
and internal regulations. However, entirely separate questions
31As Milivojevich recognizes, secular courts lack the
expertise and authority necessary to interpret church law.  Indeed,
if a secular court reviewed a church’s decision on a matter of
church law, the appeal would be “from the more learned tribunal
in the law . . . to one which is less so.”  426 U.S. at 715 n.8
(quoting Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729).
32The Supreme Court applies a similar principle to neutral
laws of general applicability that incidentally burden the activities
of an individual, as opposed to a church.  See Employment Div.,
Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
878-79 (1990) (“We have never held that an individual's religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the
contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise
jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.”).
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are raised by the application of federal laws, such as Title VII,
to a church.31  In contrast to an internal church law, Title VII,
like any federal law, falls squarely within the ken of the federal
judiciary.
In fact, in a separate line of cases addressing church
property disputes, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that
churches must adhere to laws, like Title VII, that are neutral and
of general applicability.32  The Court has even stated that this
principle extends to employment laws:  “The neutral-principles
approach cannot be said to ‘inhibit’ the free exercise of religion,
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any more than do other neutral provisions of state law governing
the manner in which churches own property, hire employees, or
purchase goods.”  Jones, 443 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added). 
In Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 443-44, a Georgia
court instructed a jury to resolve a church property dispute
between a general church and a local church based on matters of
religious doctrine.  Id.  The Supreme Court held that the Georgia
court violated the First Amendment, which “commands civil
courts to decide church property disputes without resolving
underlying controversies over religious doctrine.”  Id. at 449
(emphasis added).  Presbyterian Church, however, leaves no
doubt that religious organizations are bound by neutral laws of
general applicability that do not require inquiry into religious
doctrine.  As the Court stated, “there are neutral principles of
law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be
applied without ‘establishing’ churches to which property is
awarded.”  Id. 
The following year, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
33Jones further states: “We cannot agree . . . that the First
Amendment requires the States to adopt a rule of compulsory
deference to religious authority in resolving church property
disputes, even where no issue of doctrinal controversy is involved.”
Id. at 605 (emphasis added).  
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Presbyterian Church, holding in Maryland and Virginia
Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367, 367-68 (1970), that a Maryland court
properly considered legal documents to resolve a church
property dispute.  The Court opined that “the Maryland court’s
resolution of the dispute involved no inquiry into religious
doctrine.”  Id. at 368 (emphasis added).
 In Jones, the Court yet again stated that religious
organizations are bound by secular laws, so long as those laws
do not require inquiry into religious doctrine:  “[A] State may
adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property
disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal
matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets
of faith.” 443 U.S. at 602 (quotation omitted).33  Indeed,  courts
applying neutral laws of general applicability to religious
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institutions remain “free . . . completely from entanglement in
questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.”  Id. at 603.
Because Petruska brings suit under Title VII, the rule of
Presbyterian Church, Maryland and Virginia Churches, and
Jones will bar her suit only if an inquiry into matters of religious
doctrine is required.  Here, nothing in the complaint suggests
that Petruska’s demotion was based on religious belief, religious
doctrine, or internal church regulation.  At this stage, and as we
explain more fully in the following sections, the case requires no
inquiry into religious doctrine. 
2.
We now turn to the rationales that other courts have used
to justify the ministerial exception, inquiring whether these
rationales support an exception that applies without regard to the
motivation for an employment decision.  As discussed above,
see supra pp. 12-15, courts have offered three explanations of
why the Constitution might require the ministerial exception.
We address these arguments in turn.  
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First Rationale:  Government Scrutiny
Some of our sister circuits have opined that the
ministerial exception is necessary to avoid government scrutiny
of religious affairs.  See supra p. 13. This argument derives
largely from Catholic Bishop, where the Supreme Court held
that the NLRB lacked jurisdiction to order collective bargaining
between teachers and church-operated schools.  The Supreme
Court’s holding was based largely on the concern that NLRB
supervision would entangle the government with religious
schools, in violation of the Establishment Clause.  See Catholic
Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501-04.
In Geary, however, we distinguished Catholic Bishop and
held that a non-minister could bring a Title VII suit against a
religious employer.  We explained that employment
discrimination laws, at least as applied to a non-minister, require
far less scrutiny of religious affairs than NLRB supervision of
religious schools.  In an employment discrimination case, “[t]he
secular tribunal merely asks whether a sincerely held religious
34See also DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166,
169-70 (2d Cir. 1993) (“While the NLRB is ‘continuously involved
in the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements and
resolution of labor disputes,’ ADEA actions do not require
extensive or continuous administrative or judicial intrusion into the
functions of religious institutions.”) (citations omitted).
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belief actually motivated the institution’s actions. The
institution, at most, is called upon to explain the application of
its own doctrines.”  Geary, 7 F.3d at 330.34
Following Catholic Bishop and Geary, we must decide
whether allowing Petruska’s suit to proceed would lead to
excessive judicial scrutiny of Gannon.  In considering this
question, we take into account the principle articulated by the
Supreme Court in the church autonomy and church property
cases: A secular court must not resolve issues of religious belief,
religious doctrine, or internal church regulation.  Applying this
principle, we ask not whether courts will be required to consider
the affairs of a church in general, but whether courts will be
forced to decide  matters that Supreme Court precedent places
beyond judicial scrutiny.  
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At this stage of the litigation, we cannot say that the case
will require examination of religious belief, religious doctrine,
or internal church regulation.  Indeed, it is entirely possible that
Gannon will continue not to offer a religious justification for
Petruska’s demotion.  In such event, the decisive question for
the District Court or the jury will be whether Petruska was
demoted due to her gender, and this question will remain
independent of religious matters.
Alternatively, Gannon may offer an explanation for
Petruska’s demotion that is grounded in religious principles or
internal church regulations.  The mere assertion of either type of
explanation would not necessarily require the dismissal of
Petruska’s claims. 
We imagine that the justification could take two forms.
First, Gannon might argue that Petruska was demoted for
reasons independent of gender discrimination.  For example,
Gannon might assert that Petruska was demoted for failing to
35This example is purely illustrative, and is not based on the
record.
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attend mass, in contravention of Catholic doctrine.35
Alternatively, Gannon might concede that it discriminated
against Petruska on the basis of gender but assert that the
discrimination was grounded in religious doctrines or internal
regulations.  For example, and again speaking in the
hypothetical, Gannon might contend that Catholic doctrine does
not allow female university chaplains.  
 In the first type of case, the task of the District Court or
the jury would be to determine whether the challenged
employment action was motivated by the proffered religious
doctrine or by sex discrimination.  As in Geary, the employee
could not “challenge the validity, existence or ‘plausibility’” of
the religious doctrine itself.  See Geary, 7 F.3d at 330.
However, the employee could contend that the asserted religious
rationale “did not in fact motivate” the adverse employment
action.  Id.  
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For example, if Gannon contended that Petruska did not
attend mass, she would be precluded from asserting that
Catholic doctrine did not require her to do so.  She could,
however, argue that she was not actually demoted for failing to
attend mass.  By way of illustration, she could substantiate her
allegations that Ostrowski told her that she was being demoted
solely on the basis of her gender and that Trautman sought to
“clean house” by removing women from leadership positions.
Petruska might also cite evidence that in the past male chaplains
who refused to attend mass did not suffer adverse employment
action.  To determine whether this evidence demonstrated
gender discrimination, a factfinder would not have to delve into
religious questions.  As we stated in Geary, “[a] conclusion that
the religious reason did not in fact motivate dismissal would not
implicate entanglement since that conclusion implies nothing
about the validity of the religious doctrine or practice.”  Id.
 Gannon might instead concede that it demoted Petruska
on the basis of gender but contend that the discrimination was
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motivated by religious doctrine or internal regulation.  The
factfinder’s task would then be to determine whether the
discrimination was indeed motivated by religious principles or
church regulations; if so, the ministerial exception would bar the
claim.  Petruska could not challenge the validity of the asserted
doctrine.  Thus, if Gannon asserted that Catholicism forbids
female university chaplains, Petruska could not contend
otherwise.  Furthermore, Petruska could not prevail merely by
pointing to evidence of sex discrimination, since such
discrimination, if religiously motivated, would be beyond
judicial scrutiny.  Still, it is conceivable that Petruska could cite
evidence that she was demoted due to discrimination without
any religious basis.  For example, she might present evidence
that the decisionmakers said that they had no religious reason to
discriminate against her.  In assessing evidence of this nature,
the factfinder would not have to decide religious questions.   
If Gannon offers either type of religious rationale, the
District Court may be constitutionally required to limit
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discovery or exclude evidence designed to call into question the
validity, existence, or plausibility of the religious doctrine.  For
example, if Gannon argued that Petruska was demoted for
failure to attend mass, Petruska obviously would not be allowed
to question the doctrine by citing church law or the Bible.  In
this regard, we find the D.C. Circuit’s discussion of a minister’s
contract claim instructive:
It could turn out that in attempting to prove his
case, appellant will be forced to inquire into
matters of ecclesiastical policy . . . .  Of course, in
that situation, a court may grant summary
judgment on the ground that appellant has not
proved his case and pursuing the matter further
would create an excessive entanglement with
religion. On the other hand, it may turn out that
the potentially mischievous aspects of
[appellant’s] claim are not contested by the
Church or are subject to entirely neutral methods
of proof. The speculative nature of our discussion
here demonstrates why it is premature to foreclose
appellant’s . . . claim. Once evidence is offered,
the district court will be in a position to control
the case so as to protect against any impermissible
entanglements.
Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church,
36See also Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950 (“The limited nature of
the inquiry, combined with the ability of the district court to control
discovery, can prevent a wide-ranging intrusion into sensitive
religious matters.”).
37See DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 172 ( “[W]e are confident that the
able district judge will be able to focus the trial upon whether
DeMarco was fired because of his age or because of failure to
perform religious duties, and that this can be done without putting
into issue the validity or truthfulness of Catholic religious
teaching.”).
38As the Supreme Court has recently reminded us, “we must
‘refrain from invalidating more of [a] statute than is necessary.’”
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258 (2005) (quoting
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984)).  
48
894 F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1990).36  
We recognize that this process will  often require a
nuanced analysis of whether a piece of evidence calls religious
doctrines into question, but we are confident that the excellent
district courts in this Circuit are up to the task.37  Moreover, the
possibility that courts in this case will have to make fine
distinctions in the future is not a sufficient reason to foreclose
Petruska’s suit now.  After all, when we restrict the reach of a
statute so as to preserve the Constitution, we must cut with a
scalpel, not a butcher’s knife.38  Therefore, Petruska’s claims
49
may—or may not—present constitutional problems later on, and
we will not bar them now based on mere speculation.  
Although Gannon “would be likely to defend its
employment action on grounds related to church needs rooted in
church doctrine,” see Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442
F.3d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added), and although
this defense might require limiting discovery or excluding
certain evidence, we do not think that this possibility requires us
to prophylactically disregard the command of Congress.  Such
an approach would risk foreclosing perfectly valid claims,
thereby ignoring the will of Congress without a justification
rooted in the Constitution.  We will not, until we have a
constitutional reason to do so, enfeeble “a law triggered by a
Nation’s concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended
to improve the lot of those who had been excluded from the
American dream for so long.”  United Steelworkers of America
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (quotation omitted).
Second Rationale:  Selection of Clergy
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Aside from the “government scrutiny” rationale, which
seeks to shield churches from government inquiry, examination,
or probing, some courts have opined that the law should have no
authority over a church’s decision to fire a ministerial employee.
See supra pp. 13-14.  We agree with this argument, but only to
a point.  True, if a religious employer fired a ministerial
employee for reasons related to faith, doctrine, or internal
regulation, a judgment against the church would punish the
church for expressing its beliefs.  But where an employment
decision is devoid of religious or doctrinal content, and is based
solely on sexism, we fail to see how the decision relates to the
free exercise of religion. 
Let us assume that a male applicant and a female
applicant for a ministerial position have identical religious
views, that they are equally qualified, and that there is no
religious reason to chose one over the other.  Let us further
assume that the decisionmaker chooses the male candidate due
to sexism that is utterly unconnected to his religious beliefs.  In
39We also note that because Petruska seeks only monetary
damages, her suit does not threaten to alter the composition of
Gannon’s ministerial staff.  See Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950 (holding
that the ministerial exception did not bar a sexual harassment suit
against a religious institution, where the plaintiff sought only
damages); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1360 (“[A]s the remedy would be
limited to the award of money damages, we see no potential for
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such a case, we do not think that allowing the female candidate
to bring suit under Title VII would infringe the religious
autonomy of the church. 
Critically, a host of statutory and constitutional
protections continue to guarantee a church’s freedom to select
ministers for religious reasons.  First, religious institutions retain
the right to fire ministers for conduct inconsistent with religious
precepts or for membership in the wrong religion.  See Little,
929 F.2d at 951.  Second, as we have mentioned, religious
institutions may even practice race and sex discrimination that
is otherwise illegal, so long as the discrimination is grounded in
religious doctrine or internal regulation.  Third, a plaintiff
cannot challenge the validity  or existence of religious doctrines
in the course of litigation.39  Under the rule we now adopt,
distortion of church appointment decisions. . . .”).
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religious institutions lose only the power to fire ministerial
employees for secular reasons, a power unrelated to the exercise
of religion.  
Third Rationale:  Inquiry into Religious Doctrine
Finally, other Courts of Appeals have opined that the
ministerial exception prevents judicial inquiry into matters of
religious doctrine.  See supra pp. 14-15.  In light of our
discussion thus far, little remains to be said.  At this point in the
litigation, we cannot conclude that Petruska’s claims will raise
questions of a religious nature, requiring secular courts to
“tak[e] on the additional role of religious courts, as if the United
States were a theocracy.”  Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1042.
In sum, neither Supreme Court precedent nor the
arguments advanced by our sister circuits supports a ministerial
exception that applies without regard to the reason for an
employment decision.  We therefore reverse the dismissal of
Petruska’s Title VII sex discrimination claim.
40To repeat, Petruska alleges that she opposed limiting the
time frame during which a Gannon employee could file a sexual
harassment grievance with the university; helped prepare a report
criticizing the university’s sexual harassment policies; played a
pivotal role in notifying Ostrowski and Trautman that Rubino had
sexually harassed a Gannon employee for several years; and
opposed Trautman’s decision to allow a former Gannon priest, who
had been terminated for sexual misconduct toward students, to
enter the university’s campus.
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IV.
Independent of her sex discrimination claim, Petruska
also alleges that she was demoted in retaliation for opposing
sexual harassment at Gannon.40  We apply the same analysis to
the  retaliation claim as to the sex discrimination claim,
inquiring whether the complaint alleges that the retaliation was
based on religious belief, religious doctrine, or internal church
regulation.  There is no indication that a doctrine or regulation
prohibits opposing sexual harassment or questioning sexual
harassment policies.  Therefore, at this stage, and for the reasons
stated above, the claim does not collide with Gannon’s free
exercise rights or entangle secular courts in religious questions.
Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s dismissal of
41To allow a secular court to inquire into such matters would
contravene Milivojevich, which forbids examination of “matters of
discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law.”  426 U.S. at 713.  Applying Milivojevich, the First
Circuit dismissed a plaintiff’s claim that he was discharged in
violation of procedures “articulated in [a church’s] General
Constitution, certain Auxiliary Constitutions, and a variety of
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Petruska’s Title VII retaliation claim.  
V.
Aside from her Title VII claims, Petruska’s complaint
also contains four state law claims: breach of contract, civil
conspiracy, negligent supervision and retention, and fraudulent
misrepresentation.  While the ministerial exception as such
applies only to Title VII, courts have applied similar doctrines
to restrict state law claims arising out of the employment
relationship between a religious organization and a ministerial
employee.  
Like every court to decide the issue, we conclude that the
First Amendment bars state law claims that require an
interpretation of religious belief, religious doctrine, or internal
church regulation.41  On the other hand, courts have held that the
bylaws, rules, and regulations.”  Natal v. Christian and Missionary
Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1576 (1st Cir. 1989).  Similarly, in Lewis
v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conference, 978 F.2d 940,
943 (6th Cir. 1992), the Sixth Circuit dismissed state law claims
where the employee asserted that his dismissal was based “on a
misapplication of [church] procedures and laws.”  See also
Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 393 (6th Cir. 1986)
(dismissing contract claim based on The Discipline, a collection of
Methodist “rules, laws, and doctrinal statements”).
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religion clauses permit state law employment claims that do not
require inquiry into such matters.  In Minker, a Methodist
minister asserted two contract claims against the United
Methodist Church: (1) breach of promises to find him a more
suitable congregation and (2) violation of the Book of
Discipline, a statement of church law.  894 F.2d at 1355-56.
The Court held that the religion clauses barred the Book of
Discipline claim, which would require interpreting “matters of
essential religious dogma.”  Id. at 1358.  However, the Court
permitted the oral promise claim, which did not require inquiry
into such matters.  The Court reasoned that “[a] church is always
free to burden its activities voluntarily through contracts, and
42Similarly, the Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a
minister’s state law employment claims, reasoning, “[a]t the
present stage of this litigation we are unable to predict that the
evidence offered at trial will definitely involve the district court in
an impermissible inquiry into . . . bylaws or religious beliefs.”
Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, 991 F.2d 468, 471 (8th Cir. 1993);
see also Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171 (“Like any other person or
organization, [churches] may be held liable for their torts and upon
their valid contracts.”).
43In alleging that she was removed as chaplain, Petruska
alludes to Gannon’s Policies and Procedures Manual, which lists
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such contracts are fully enforceable in civil court.”  Id. at 1359.42
Applying the reasoning of Minker, we ask whether, at
this stage of litigation, each of Petruska’s state law claims
requires an examination of matters of faith, doctrine, or internal
regulation.   
A.  Breach of Contract
Petruska alleges that Gannon, by demoting her, breached
her contract to serve as chaplain for three years.  At this stage,
we cannot assume that interpreting Petruska’s contract will give
rise to questions of religious belief, religious doctrine, or
internal church regulation.43  See Drevlow v. Lutheran Church,
the duties of the chaplain.  Presumably, the manual is a statement
of Gannon’s internal regulations.  On remand, the religion clauses
may bar Petruska from citing the manual as evidence of her breach
of contract claim, for in order to evaluate such evidence, the
factfinder might have to consider questions of internal church
regulation.
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991 F.2d 468, 471 (8th Cir. 1993).  Accordingly, we reverse the
dismissal of Petruska’s breach of contract claim. 
B.  Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Petruska’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim is based on
(1) Gannon’s representations that it is an equal opportunity
employer and (2) Rubino’s assurance at the time of Petruska’s
promotion to chaplain that her tenure would reflect her
performance as opposed to her gender.  At least at the outset,
Petruska’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim “do[es] not
inevitably or even necessarily lead to government inquiry into
[Gannon’s] religious mission or doctrines.”  Geary, 7 F.3d at
329. 
While the religion clauses do not bar Petruska’s
fraudulent misrepresentation claim, she has failed to plead fraud
44See Christidis v. First Pennsylvania Mortg. Trust, 717
F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that the requirements of Rule
9(b) “appl[y] not only to fraud actions under federal statutes, but to
fraud claims based on state law.”).
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with sufficient particularity under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b).44  We therefore affirm the District Court’s
dismissal of this claim. 
C.  Negligent Supervision and Retention and Civil
Conspiracy 
Petruska’s negligent supervision and retention claim and
her civil conspiracy claim flow directly from her Title VII
allegations.   Civil conspiracy requires proof that two or more
persons combined to do an unlawful act or to do an otherwise
lawful act by unlawful means.  See, e.g., Thompson Coal Co. v.
Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 211 (Pa. 1979).  Here, the
underlying unlawful acts are the very violations of Title VII
discussed in the previous sections.  
Likewise, Petruska’s negligent supervision and retention
claim flows from her Title VII allegations: She claims that
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Gannon negligently supervised and retained the employees who
discriminated against her.  Gannon has not asserted a reason for
the retention of these employees that is grounded in faith,
doctrine, or internal regulation.  
As a corollary to our conclusion that Petruska must be
allowed to proceed with her Title VII claims, we hold that at this
stage the First Amendment does not foreclose her conspiracy
and negligent supervision and retention claims. We therefore
reverse the District Court’s dismissal of these claims.
VI.
At this stage of litigation, Petruska’s claim offends
neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Establishment Clause.
We therefore hold that the religion clauses do not bar Petruska’s
causes of action, and we reverse the dismissal of all claims, with
the exception of the fraudulent misrepresentation claim.  We
stress that constitutional defects in Petruska’s causes of action
may emerge as the case proceeds, and that the District Court
must avoid them scrupulously, applying the guidance we have
45We reject Petruska’s argument that Gannon waived the
ministerial exception as a defense.  See Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1042
(“[T]he ministerial exception . . . is not subject to waiver or
estoppel . . . . A federal court will not allow itself to get dragged
into a religious controversy even if a religious organization wants
it dragged in.”).  Because Gannon did not waive the ministerial
exception, Gannon may assert the exception, as defined by this
opinion, in further proceedings.
60
provided.45  Ultimately, the constitutional concerns that lurk at
the periphery of this case may defeat Petruska’s claims.  But that
is a question for another day.
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SMITH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although the majority professes to adopt a “carefully
tailored version of the ministerial exception” to Title VII, Maj.
Op. at 3, in fact, by treating ministers like lay employees, it
effectively refuses to recognize any ministerial exception,
placing this Court at odds with every other federal court of
appeals to consider the issue.  The majority holds that “where a
church discriminates for reasons unrelated to religion, . . . the
Constitution does not foreclose Title VII suits.”  Maj. Op. at 4.
It concludes that because Gannon has not–or at least not
yet–articulated a “religious belief, religious doctrine, or internal
regulation” as a basis for its decision to restructure, adjudication
of Petruska’s claims does not offend the First Amendment.  Id.
I disagree with the majority’s fundamental premise that a
church’s choice regarding who performs particular spiritual
functions is not necessarily a religious decision.  Rather, in my
view, such a decision is, by its very nature, a religious one.
Consequently, government interference with that decision
necessarily infringes on a church’s free exercise of religion and
entangles the courts in religious matters.  I would therefore
apply the ministerial exception to any claim which limits a
church’s right to choose who will perform particular spiritual
functions, without regard to whether it articulates an
independent justification based on “religious belief, religious
doctrine, or internal regulation.”
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Gannon’s
motion to dismiss is properly considered under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and that Petruska failed to allege
fraudulent misrepresentation with sufficient specificity under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).  Accordingly, I concur in
the introduction of Part III and in Part V.B. of the Opinion.  I
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also agree that adjudication of Petruska’s breach of contract
claim would not violate the First Amendment, and therefore
likewise concur in Part V.A.  However, because Petruska’s own
complaint establishes that her primary duties included spiritual
functions and because her Title VII, civil conspiracy, and
negligent supervision and retention claims implicate the
church’s right to select its spiritual leaders, I would hold that
these claims are barred by the ministerial exception.  I therefore
respectfully dissent.
I.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.”  U.S. Const. amend. I.  The Religion Clauses extend to
both legislative and judicial action, see Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church of North Amer., 363
U.S. 190, 191 (1960), and apply equally to state and federal
laws, see Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1,
8 (2004) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940)).  The Free Exercise Clause protects both the “right to
believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires,”
Employment Division, Dep’t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 877 (1990), and the right of religious institutions to
decide “matters of church government” as well as questions of
“discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law.”  See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344
U.S. 94, 116 (1952); Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976).  The Establishment Clause, by
contrast, prohibits government action that serves to advance or
inhibit religion or that results in excessive entanglement “in
questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.”  See Jones
46  See, e.g., EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh,
213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); Rayburn v. Gen’l Conf. of Seventh
Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985); Combs v. Central
Texas Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343
(5th Cir. 1999); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.
1972); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d
698 (7th Cir. 2003); Young v. Northern Illinois Conf. of United
Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994); Scharon v. St.
Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir.
1991); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir.
2004); Bollard v. Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999);
Gellington v. Chistian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299
(11th Cir. 2000);  EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Amer., 83 F.3d 455
(D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th
Cir. 1999) (applying ministerial exception to Americans with
Disabilities Act claim); Werft v. Desert Southwest Annual Conf. of
the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004)
(same).
The First Circuit also addressed the application of the First
Amendment to a minister’s claims in Natal v. Christian Missionary
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v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612-13 (1971).
The questions presented in this case are whether applying
Title VII to Gannon’s decision to restructure would infringe
upon its free exercise rights and whether adjudication of
Petruska’s Title VII claims would result in unconstitutional
entanglement under the Establishment Clause.  Every circuit that
has considered the issue has concluded that application of Title
VII to a minister-church relationship would violate–or would
risk violating–the First Amendment and, accordingly, has
recognized some version of the ministerial exception.46  To the
Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir. 1989)  Although the case
involved state law claims rather than any federal employment
discrimination law, the Court made clear that inquiry into
allegations related to a minister’s employment would be barred by
the First Amendment.  Specifically, it explained:
Because of the difficulties inherent in separating the
message from the messenger–a religious
organization’s fate is inextricably bound up with
those whom it entrusts with the responsibilities of
preaching its word and ministering to its
adherents–Natal’s case necessarily falls within the
scope of the Court’s monition.  By its nature, the
inquiry which Natal would have us undertake into
the circumstances of his discharge plunges an
inquisitor into a maelstrom of Church policy,
administration, and governance.  It is an inquiry
barred by the Free Exercise Clause.
Id. at 1578.
47  In evaluating whether a particular employee is subject to
the ministerial exception, other circuits have concluded that the
focus should be on the “function of the position.”  Rayburn, 772
F.2d at 1168.  As a general rule, an employee will be considered a
minister if her primary duties include “teaching, spreading the
faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or
supervision of participation in religious ritual and worship.”  Id. at
1169; see, e.g., Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 703 (applying
ministerial exception to Hispanic Communications Director who
functioned as a “press secretary” for the church); Starkman, 198
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extent that a claim involves the church’s selection of clergy–in
other words, its choice as to who will perform particular
spiritual functions47–most of these circuits have held that the
F.3d at 175-76 (holding that Choir Director at Methodist church
was minister for purposes of First Amendment analysis); Catholic
Univ., 83 F.3d at 455 (applying exception to professor of canon law
at Catholic University).  Although I do not view this list as
exclusive, I agree that the focus on the function of an employee’s
position is the proper one.
48  See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (“[T]he free exercise
clause of the First Amendment protects the act of a decision rather
than a motivation behind it.  In these sensitive areas, the state may
no more require a minimum basis in doctrinal reasoning than it
may supervise doctrinal content”); Combs, 173 F.3d at 350 (“We
cannot conceive how the federal judiciary could determine whether
an employment decision concerning a minister was based on
legitimate grounds without inserting ourselves into a  realm where
the Constitution forbids us to tread.”); Young, 21 F.3d at 186
(quoting Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 ); Scharon, 929 F.2d at 363
(“Personnel decisions by church-affiliated institutions affecting
clergy are per se religious matters and cannot be reviewed by civil
courts for to review such decisions would require the courts to
determine the meaning of religious doctrine and canonical law and
to impose a secular court’s view of whether in the context of the
particular case religious doctrine and canonical law support the
decision the church authorities have made.  This is precisely the
kind of judicial second-guessing of decision-making by religious
organizations that the Free Exercise Clause forbids.”) (citations
omitted); Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947 (indicating that a “Jesuit order’s
choice of representative” is ordinarily “a decision to which we
would simply defer without further inquiry”); Minker, 894 F.2d at
1357 (finding that court need not determine whether reasons for
employment decision were “independently ecclesiastical in nature”
to apply ministerial exception).
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exception bars any inquiry into a religious organization’s
underlying motivation for the contested employment decision.48
As the majority notes in footnote 6, “[a]lthough the Eleventh
Circuit has recognized the ministerial exception, see Gellington,
203 F.3d 1299, it does not appear to address whether the exception
applies without regard to motive.”  Maj. Op. at 13, n.6.  Although
I generally agree with the majority’s characterization of Gellington,
I note that the Eleventh Circuit seems to tacitly approve of a
conclusion by the Fifth Circuit that “the constitutional protection
of religious freedom afforded to churches in employment actions
involving clergy exists even when such actions are not based on
issues of church doctrine or ecclesiastical law.”  Gellington, 203
F.3d at 1303 (citing Combs, 173 F.3d at 350).
66
I would likewise hold.
A.
The majority opines that adjudication of Petruska’s
claims would not violate the Free Exercise Clause–unless and
until Gannon articulates a “religious belief, religious doctrine,
or internal regulation” as a justification for its decision to
restructure–because the Constitution protects only “religious
exercise.”  Maj. Op. at 28 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 564 (1997) (O’Connor, J, dissenting)).  I agree with
the majority’s basic premise that a church must be engaged in
religious exercise in order to trigger protection under the Free
Exercise Clause.  In my view, however, the process of selecting
a minister is per se a religious exercise.  A minister is not merely
an employee of the church; she is the embodiment of its
message.  A minister serves as the church’s public
representative, its ambassador, and its voice to the faithful.  As
the Fifth Circuit explained:  “The relationship between an
organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood.  The minister
is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its
49  In addition to their role within the religious organization,
ministers also have a direct relationship with a church’s members:
Ministers marry their children and bury their parents; they act as
their spiritual counselors and serve as their moral advisors.  To
these members, the selection of a minister is undoubtedly a
question of religious concern. 
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purpose.”  McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-59
(5th Cir. 1972). Accordingly, “[m]atters touching this
relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime
ecclesiastical concern.”  Id. at 559.49 
As previously noted, the Free Exercise Clause protects
two rights: the right to believe and profess matters of faith and
the right of religious institutions to decide questions of
governance and internal organization.  In this case, those rights
are interrelated.  
First, like an individual, a church in its collective capacity
must be free to express religious beliefs, profess matters of faith,
and communicate its religious message.  However, unlike an
individual who can speak on her own behalf, the church as an
institution must retain the corollary right to select its voice.
Accordingly, any restriction of the church’s right to choose who
will carry its spiritual message necessarily infringes upon its
Free Exercise right to profess its beliefs.  This right is squarely
at issue in Petruska’s complaint.  
The second right protected by the Free Exercise
Clause–the church’s right to decide matters of governance and
internal organization–is also implicated by Gannon’s decision
to restructure.  The majority contends that this right only
protects “a religious institution’s freedom to interpret its own
50  Petruska argues that she was not a “chaplain” as that term
is understood in the Roman Catholic Church, nor did she have any
written job requirements which specifically defined her position at
the University.  Nevertheless, Petruska’s own complaint establishes
that her primary duties involved ministerial functions.  Among
other things, Petruska alleges that she served as co-chair for the
Catholic Identity Task Force, held prayer services, and was
traditionally involved in planning liturgies.  Moreover, as the
District Court correctly noted, her own “performance objectives”
included “develop[ing] strategies to increase participation in
sacramental life of [the] Gannon community.”  It is clear from the
face of Petruska’s complaint that the functions she performed as
University Chaplain were ministerial in nature.  
With respect to the Vice President of Mission and Ministry
position, Petruska alleges that Rouch was installed in that role and
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laws and internal regulations.”  Maj. Op. at 31.  Because
Gannon has not identified an internal regulation or religious
doctrine that required it to create the position of Vice President
for Mission and Ministry and to hire Father Rouch to fill that
position, the majority contends that the free exercise right to
determine matters of governance and internal organization is not
at issue.  Maj. Op. at 29-31 (distinguishing Serbian Eastern
Orthodox v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), Gonzalez v.
Roman Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929), and Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872)).  I disagree.
The Vice President for Mission and Ministry and the
University Chaplain at Gannon both serve spiritual functions–in
other words, the primary duties of those employees include
“teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision
of a religious order, or supervision of participation in religious
ritual and worship.”50  See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.
served in a supervisory capacity over the Chaplain’s Division.  To
the extent that the Vice President of Mission and Ministry
supervises spiritual functionaries, at least some of the functions he
performs are, by definition, spiritual functions.
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Accordingly, Gannon’s decisions regarding who to install in
those positions and the manner in which their duties would be
divided were decisions about who would perform those
constitutionally protected spiritual functions.  Those choices are
protected from governmental interference by the Free Exercise
Clause.  
The majority further opines that there is “no doubt that
religious organizations are bound by neutral laws of general
applicability that do not require inquiry into religious doctrine.”
Maj. Op. at 32-34 (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606
(1979); Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 445 (1969); Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the
Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 396 US. 367,
367-68 (1970); Employment Division, Dep’t of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).  The
majority cites Jones for the proposition that “‘[t]he neutral-
principles approach cannot be said to ‘inhibit’ the free exercise
of religion, any more than do other neutral provisions of state
law governing the manner in which churches own property, hire
employees, or purchase goods.’” Maj. Op. at 32 (citing Jones,
443 U.S. at 606)(emphasis in the majority opinion).  
Title VII is indeed a neutral law of general applicability,
and it undoubtedly applies to lay employment decisions by
religious institutions.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3;
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but see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (providing an exception for
“religious corporation, association, educational institution, or
society with respect to employment of individuals of a particular
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on . . . of
its activities); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (permitting religious
educational institutions “to hire and employ employees of a
particular religion”).  However, because I view a church’s
selection of its minister as essential to the church’s right to
express religious beliefs, profess matters of faith, and
communicate its religious message, I differ with the majority’s
conclusion that application of Title VII in this case does not
violate the Free Exercise Clause.  See Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at
463 (“We conclude from our review of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence that whereas the Free Exercise Clause guarantees
a church’s freedom to decide how it will govern itself, what it
will teach, and to whom it will entrust its ministerial
responsibilities, it does not guarantee the right of its members to
practice what their church may preach if that practice is
forbidden by a neutral law of general application.”).  In reaching
its conclusion that the language in Jones applies equally to lay
employees and ministers, the majority has effectively refused to
adopt the ministerial exception recognized in our sister courts of
appeals.  Because I agree with those courts that interference with
a church’s selection of clergy violates the First Amendment, I
cannot join my colleagues in the majority.
B.
Although, in my view, the Free Exercise Clause bars
any claim which limits a church’s right to choose who will
fulfill particular spiritual functions–in this case, Petruska’s
Title VII discrimination and retaliation, civil conspiracy, and
negligent supervision and retention claims–I nevertheless
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address the Establishment Clause in response to the majority’s
treatment of that issue.  The majority holds that, unless and
until Gannon articulates a “religious belief, religious doctrine,
or internal regulation” as a justification for its decision to
install Father Rouch as Vice President of Mission and
Ministry, there is no risk of unconstitutional entanglement
under the Establishment Clause.  I do not agree.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court set forth a
three-prong test to determine the validity of a statute under the
Establishment Clause:  “First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; . . .
and finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive
government entanglement with religion.’”  403 U.S. 602, 612-
13 (1971) (citations omitted).  Only the entanglement prong is
at issue with respect to Title VII. 
Excessive entanglement would arise if our inquiry into
Gannon’s decision to restructure traversed questions of the
validity of religious beliefs or practice.  See Geary, 7 F.3d at
330.  Because, as discussed above, a church’s choice 
regarding who will perform its spiritual functions is inherently
a religious decision, any inquiry into that decision would
traverse such questions.  Even though the decision here
involves an individual act rather than general practice, the
necessary inquiry–asking whether the church can justify its
employment decision with reference to church
doctrine–excessively entangles the court.
The majority relies on Geary to support its conclusion
that application of Title VII in this case would not run afoul of
the Establishment Clause.  The decision in Geary, however,
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actually undermines the majority’s position.  The Geary
Court, specifically distinguishes between decisions involving
clergy and those involving lay employees. 
In Geary, a fifty-year-old teacher was fired by the
Catholic school that employed her.  The school’s stated
reason for dismissal was that Geary had married a divorced
man in violation of church doctrine.  Id.  We concluded that
resolution of Geary’s Age Discrimination in Employment Act
claims would not offend the Establishment Clause because the
inquiry was limited to whether the school discriminated
against her on the basis of her age and canceled her insurance
in retaliation for her initiation of legal proceedings.  Id. 
Geary did not challenge the validity of the religious doctrine;
she merely claimed that the religious doctrine did not
motivate the adverse employment action.  Id. at 329.  We held
that “when the pretext inquiry neither traverses questions of
the validity of religious beliefs nor forces a court to choose
between parties’ competing religious visions, that inquiry
does not present a significant risk of entanglement.”  Id. at
330.  
The Geary Court itself, however, distinguished cases
involving members of the clergy, stating that
“notwithstanding Geary’s apparent general employment
obligation to be a visible witness to the Catholic Church’s
philosophy and principles, a court could adjudicate Geary’s
claims without the entanglement that would follow were
employment of clergy or religious leaders involved.”  Id. at
331 (emphasis added).  As we suggested in Geary,
entanglement necessarily results when a court inquires into a
decision regarding who performs spiritual functions on behalf
of the church, because, unlike lay employees, that decision is
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inherently a religious matter.  Again, notwithstanding the
majority’s claim that it is crafting a narrow ministerial
exception, its failure to acknowledge the distinction drawn in
Geary between lay employees and ministers is tantamount to
a refusal to adopt any such exception.
II.
As described above, the ministerial exception should
operate to bar any claims that limit a church’s right to choose
who will perform its spiritual functions.  Accordingly, in this
case, the relevant question with respect to each claim is whether
application of the state or federal law will limit Gannon’s right
to choose who performs particular spiritual functions on its
behalf.  Petruska asserts six claims in her First Amended
Complaint: two violations of Title VII–discrimination and
retaliation (Counts I and II, respectively); fraudulent
misrepresentation (Count III); civil conspiracy (Count IV);
breach of contract (Count V); and negligent supervision and
retention (Count VI).  I submit that resolution of Counts I, II,
IV, and VI would impose unconstitutional limits on Gannon’s
First Amendment rights.  Consequently, I would hold that they
are barred by the ministerial exception.
A.
Petruska alleges that Gannon demoted and constructively
discharged her from her position as University Chaplain based
on her gender and retaliated against her on the basis of her
opposition to sexual harassment at the University.  Her
discrimination and retaliation claims are premised upon
Gannon’s decision to restructure, a decision which Petruska
argues was merely pretext for gender discrimination.  It is clear
51  I acknowledge that it may not always be clear whether a
minister’s Title VII claim involves “a church’s decision regarding
who will perform spiritual functions.  For example, in  Elvig v.
Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 2004), the
Ninth Circuit considered a Presbyterian minister’s claims that she
was sexually harassed and subject to retaliation by her supervising
pastor.  The Elvig Court recognized that a church’s decisions in
selecting its clergy are protected by the First Amendment and held
that to the extent that a plaintiff’s claims implicated ministerial
employment decisions, the claims were foreclosed.  Nevertheless,
over a vigorous dissent, the Court concluded that, in that case, the
sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation
claims (verbal abuse and intimidation) did not implicate protected
employment decisions.  It therefore reversed the district court’s
order dismissing those claims. 
In Petruska’s case, the retaliatory conduct at issue is the
employment decision itself, which Elvig recognizes as a decision
protected by the Free Exercise Clause.  Because Petruska does not
raise a sexual harassment or hostile work environment claim and
because the retaliatory conduct she alleges constitutes a protected
choice, we need not decide today whether the types of claims in
Elvig would fall within the ministerial exception to Title VII.
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from the face of Petruska’s complaint, however, that Gannon’s
choice to restructure constituted a decision about who would
perform spiritual functions and about how those functions would
be divided.  Accordingly, application of Title VII’s
discrimination and retaliation provisions to Gannon’s decision
to restructure would violate the First Amendment.51  For that
reason, Petruska’s Title VII claims (Counts I and II) should be
dismissed.
52  I agree with the majority insofar as it concludes that
Petruska has failed to plead fraud with sufficient specificity under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), and accordingly, concur in its
judgment to affirm the dismissal of Count III.  
53 Civil conspiracy requires proof that two or more persons
combined to do an unlawful act or to do an otherwise lawful act by
unlawful means. See, e.g., Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal, 412
A.2d 466, 472 (Pa. 1979). 
54 Under Pennsylvania law, an employer may be liable for
negligent supervision “where the employer fails to exercise
ordinary care to prevent an intentional harm to a third party which
(1) is committed on the employer’s premises by an employee acting
outside the scope of his employment and (2) is reasonably
foreseeable.” Mullen v. Topper’s Salon & Health Spa, Inc., 99 F.
Supp. 2d 553, 556 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (citations omitted).  Although
Petruska’s First Amended Complaint is replete with references to
the current priest sexual abuse scandals and allegations that Bishop
Trautman covered up harassment and abuse directed towards other
individuals, the only intentional harm to which she claims she was




Petruska’s First Amended Complaint also contains three
state tort claims: civil conspiracy, negligent supervision and
retention, and fraudulent misrepresentation.52  The civil
conspiracy53 and negligent supervision54 claims turn on
Petruska’s ability to prove that Gannon’s restructuring
constituted an unlawful or tortious act.  In this case, the alleged
underlying unlawful act is the violation of Title VII.  Because I
would hold that Gannon’s decision to restructure fell within the




Finally, Petruska asserts a state law breach of contract
claim.  Petruska alleges that pursuant to her contract with
Gannon, she was entitled to serve on the President’s Staff and
lead the Chaplain’s Division.  She claims that by removing her
from these positions, Gannon breached its promise.  
On its face, application of state contract law does not
involve government-imposed limits on Gannon’s right to select
its ministers: Unlike the duties under Title VII and state tort law,
contractual obligations are entirely voluntary.  As the court
noted in Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United
Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1990), “[a]
church is always free to burden its activities voluntarily through
contract, and such contracts are fully enforceable in civil court.”
See also, e.g., Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171 (“Like any other
organization, [churches] may be held liable . . . upon their valid
contracts.”).  Enforcement of a promise, willingly made and
supported by consideration, in no way constitutes a state-
imposed limit upon a church’s free exercise rights.
Accordingly, application of state law to Petruska’s contract
claim would not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
Similarly, at least at the outset, resolution of Petruska’s
breach of contract claim would not excessively entangle the
court in a religious matter.  For purposes of evaluating
Petruska’s contract claim, we need not examine Gannon’s
decisions with respect to which  individuals will perform
particular spiritual functions; rather, we need only inquire as to
whether Gannon promised Petruska that she would be entitled
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to perform those functions for a specified period of time.  In that
respect, the claim potentially can “be adduced by a fairly direct
inquiry” into whether there was an offer, acceptance,
consideration, and breach.  Minker, 894 F.2d at 1360.  If
Gannon’s response to Petruska’s allegations raise issues which
would result in excessive entanglement, the claims may subject
to dismissal on summary judgment.  See id.  The allegations in
Petruska’s complaint, however, do not demand such a
conclusion.  I would therefore remand this claim for further
consideration by the District Court.
III.
A church’s choice regarding who will perform its
spiritual functions is, by its very nature, a religious decision.  By
rejecting this basic premise, the majority effectively declines to
adopt a ministerial exception, placing this Court at odds with
every other federal court of appeals to consider the issue.
Because, in my view, the majority’s holding permits
governmental interference with a religious institution’s
constitutionally-protected choices in violation of the First
Amendment, I respectfully dissent.
